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G
overnments in Asia used grain 
price stabilization as a major 
policy instrument when they 
began to promote the Green Revolution 
in the 1960s. In the process, they created 
parastatal agencies, which were quasi-
governmental in nature, to undertake 
public marketing activities in basic 
staples such as rice and wheat. These 
operations often meant providing a 
support price to farmers, procuring 
staples on government account, holding 
public stocks, and distributing these 
stocks through public distribution 
systems or open market operations to 
hold the price line for consumers. This 
led to a sizeable degree of government 
intervention in most of these countries’ 
grain markets, which continues to a 
large extent today.
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However, the art of public policymaking is to know when to 
introduce government interventions and when to withdraw 
them. Frequently, governments forget the withdrawal part, 
leading to high costs that are sometimes unsustainable. Using 
case studies from South and Southeast Asia, a new book 
entitled From Parastatals to Private Trade: Lessons from Asian 
Agriculture (published for IFPRI by Johns Hopkins University 
Press for OECD countries and by Oxford University Press 
for South Asian countries) suggests five key lessons that can 
be learned from more than three decades of parastatal oper-
ations with regard to price stabilization in Asia.
1.  Under certain circumstances, public grain-price 
stabilization can contribute positively to increased 
agricultural growth and overall economic devel-
opment.  Price stabilization was vital to widespread 
adoption of new high-yielding wheat and rice varieties 
and benefited both producers and consumers, leading to 
increased economic growth and decreased poverty and 
undernutrition throughout the region.
2.  However, there are two pre-conditions for  
the success of public intervention in grain mar-
kets.  The first is the presence of market failure. 
Throughout Asia in the 1960s, infrastructure was weak, 
flow of market information was poor, international 
markets were thin and volatile, and foreign exchange 
reserves were minimal, which often led to market  
failures. The second is that there should be a high 
level of government commitment in terms  
of improved incentives, institutions, and invest-
ments for increasing grain production.  Price  
stabilization through parastatal agencies is only one  
part of the package.
3.  Conditions change as times change.  During the past 
three to four decades, infrastructure has improved sig-
nificantly. International markets are much more robust, 
although the current price spike in 2008 is troubling. 
The foreign currency reserves and import capacities of 
different Asian countries have increased dramatically. 
Promoting technology adoption is no longer a persuasive 
justification for intervention, since most of the farms 
in Asia are already using improved varieties of rice and 
wheat. And consumption patterns are rapidly shifting 
from staples to high-value agricultural products such as 
livestock, fish, fruits, and vegetables.
4.  Parastatal agencies can incur huge costs in stabi-
lizing grain prices.  The financial costs, though initially 
modest, have become very large. The parastatals are less 
efficient than the private traders and are being increas-
ingly exploited by special-interest and rent-seeking groups. 
Also, it is worth noting that once parastatal agencies are 
created, they are very difficult to reform or dismantle. The 
parastatals create strong political lobbies, which lead to 
even higher costs.
5.  Governments still have a positive, although differ-
ent, role to play in their grain markets. They should 
now focus on “getting the markets right,” instead of focus-
ing just on “getting the prices right.”
CounTry experienCes
India. During the mid-1960s, India experienced two consecutive 
droughts that reduced the production of foodgrains by almost 
20 percent. India was bailed out by a large volume of U.S. food 
aid that severely strained the country’s pride. In 1963, new high-
yielding wheat varieties first began to be grown experimentally, 
and by 1966, the prospects for a Green Revolution appeared 
promising. The Food Corporation of India (FCI) and the Agricul-
tural Prices Commission were created in 1965 to ensure “remu-
nerative prices” to the cultivators while the new seeds were 
being introduced. What marked the most significant departure 
from the old ways was the seriousness with which policy recom-
mendations were translated into action through the emergence 
of an integrated food and agricultural policy.
During the past four decades, the successes have been 
spectacular. Wheat production has increased sixfold, and rice 
production has more than doubled. The proportion of hun-
gry people has been halved. India is now one of the fastest 
growing countries in the world, aspiring to sustain an annual 
growth rate approaching double digits. However, subsidy bills 
for buffer stocking increased from US$160 million in 1992 
to US$1.6 billion in 2002. And today, the FCI consists of 
about 40,000 officers and staff, 60,000 regular food-handling 
employees, 100,000 food-handling laborers, almost half a mil-
lion ration shops, a quarter billion ration-card holders, and 
more than 6,000 state marketing and regulatory agencies.
Pakistan. The Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Ser-
vices Corporation (PASSCO) was established in 1973 to 
mitigate seasonal price swings in the major urban centers. 
Under a new system begun in 1987, the government supplies 
wheat from its stocks at uniform issue prices to designated 
flour mills, which are required to supply atta (rough milled 
grain) through general stores in the market. In recent years, 
PASSCO’s role has been limited to the regular procurement 
of wheat and the occasional procurement of paddy. Inter-
vention with other crops has been characterized by an ad-
hoc approach. In 2002/03, the provincial food subsidy was 
more than US$100 million, which was 12  percent greater 
than the entire Public Sector Development Program budget 
for the Health Division.
Bangladesh. Public policy has evolved to achieve mul-
tiple objectives: targeted distribution for poverty alleviation, 
disaster management, and price stabilization. Unlike its neigh-
bors, Bangladesh controls price support and public distribu-
tion through the Department of Food. Moreover, unlike the 
other countries under review, Bangladesh liberalized trade 
policy in 1994 to permit imports by private traders.
 Bangladesh’s experience demonstrates that reduc-
tions in public intervention can promote competition in the 
domestic markets, reduce subsidies, and release funds for 
development and poverty alleviation—all without jeopar-
dizing price stability and food security. The share of public 
food in poverty-alleviation programs increased from as low 
as 32 percent during the pre-reform period (1971/72 to 3
1991/92) to as high as 85 percent during the post-reform 
period (1992/93 to 2002/03), the total number of traders 
increased significantly following liberalization, and annual 
food subsidy bills declined from US$122 million in the 1980s 
to about half that amount in the 1990s.
Indonesia. The downfall of the Sukarno government 
in the late 1960s triggered an aggressive public approach 
to food security in Indonesia. The new government was 
especially sensitive to the social unrest generated by high 
rice prices that had created political instability under the 
previous government. Key elements of President Suharto’s 
New Order approach were heavy investment in the rural 
economy to increase rice production and sustained efforts 
to stabilize the price of rice, including the implementation 
of a price band.
Rice production has quadrupled since the beginning of 
the Green Revolution, while GNP per capita, which grew 
at an amazing 5 percent per year, has tripled. Poverty and 
undernutrition have been significantly reduced. However, 
the total costs of the price stabilization agency’s inefficiency 
(the subsidy) have grown and were estimated at US$2 bil-
lion from 1993 to 1998.
Philippines. The government has regulated and inter-
vened in rice and corn markets for decades. In 1981, during a 
crisis in which the global rice supply was scarce, the domestic 
supply of white corn (a substitute for rice) was short, and 
the retail prices of both rice and corn were high, the govern-
ment decided that it had to implement a price ceiling and rice 
rationing to defend the ceiling. The National Food Authority 
(NFA) was given the mandate to protect consumers, pro-
mote rice self-sufficiency, and develop post-harvest technol-
ogy for grain. Today, it is both a regulator and a corporation 
engaged in grain trading. It has been the sole importer of rice 
into the Philippines for more than 25 years.
Rice production in the Philippines has tripled during the 
past three decades. However, this has not translated into 
dramatic increases in GNP or reductions in poverty and food 
insecurity, as has been the case in other Asian countries. 
Between 1996 and 1998, average annual losses due to ineffi-
cient and ineffective NFA operations were estimated at more 
than US$414 million.
Vietnam. In the initial phase of the unification of North 
and South Vietnam, agriculture was a major disappointment, 
making reform imperative. Farmers responded impressively to 
the new incentives, and, as a result, per capita food produc-
tion grew from 273 kg in 1981 to 304 kg in 1985. However, 
the fiscal deficit ballooned, and the government announced 
it would move toward a more market-oriented economy. By 
1989, compulsory government procurement of farm products 
was eliminated, and private traders were allowed to purchase 
directly from farmers.
Market liberalization has contributed to increased produc-
tion, enhanced technology adoption, and increased competi-
tion in domestic rice markets. Rice production grew at a rate 
of more than 5 percent between 1988 and 1995, transforming 
Vietnam from being a chronic food-deficit country to a leading  
exporter of rice in Asia.
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Why Do Parastatals-Centered Policies Have to 
Change?  There are three main reasons. First, the rationales 
for public intervention in foodgrains markets, especially in  
Asia, have changed over the years. The key determinants of 
market integration—infrastructure and information flow—
have improved dramatically, and recent studies suggest that  
domestic markets are well integrated in all Asian countries. 
Notwithstanding the current situation, international markets 
for wheat and rice are much more robust. The justification 
for protecting farmers against technological risks is no longer 
convincing because farmers have mastered new technologies 
and high-yielding varieties now cover almost all area sown 
to rice and wheat. The international liquidity constraint has 
improved so much that the value of potential cereal imports 
now accounts for only a tiny fraction of total foreign currency 
reserves in the countries reviewed.
Second, the food marketing parastatals are becoming 
increasingly expensive and wasteful, and alternative institution-
al mechanisms for achieving price stability and food security 
are far less expensive and distorting. The unit marketing costs 
of parastatals are higher than those of the private sector, the 
margin of costs between parastatals and the private sector are 
widening, and parastatals’ operations are being increasingly dic-
tated by special interests.
Finally, rice and wheat, the main focus of the parastatals, 
are not as likely to drive agricultural growth in the future. 
On the demand side, consumer preferences are changing 
away from cereals. On the supply side, small farmers cannot 
expect to make a satisfactory living from growing wheat and 
rice on their progressively smaller landholdings. Therefore, a 
rational farmer would consider other options for increasing 
income—for example, high-value foodcrops such as fruits, 
vegetables, and oilseeds—in addition to or in place of  
wheat and rice.
When Must This Change Occur?  The parastatals and 
the regulations enacted to facilitate their operations have out-
lived their usefulness. Prolonging the inevitable will mean losses 
in growth and employment at considerable economic and 
political costs to each country. Moreover, prolonging the inevi-
table will allow special interests to become more entrenched, 
making change even more difficult. Both Bangladesh and Viet-
nam have liberalized, although to different degrees, and have 
successfully demonstrated that the same set of food-policy 
objectives can be achieved through reduced intervention.
How Must This Change Occur? — The Way Forward. 
Changing parastatals-centered policies will require opening up 
the economy, letting private trade compete on a level playing 
field with public parastatals, and using public policy to regulate 
and supplement, rather than replace, the private market.
Many Asian countries are hesitant to open up their econo-
mies and continue to restrict international foodgrains trade in 
one form or another. A more effective and strategic response would be to use variable tariffs, in a transparent and WTO-
compatible way, to guard domestic markets against world price 
volatility. Complementarities between changes in the inter-
national trade environment and domestic policies are at the 
core of how developing countries will be affected by the future 
international trade environment.
Creating a level playing field requires that policy deci-
sions in such areas as movement, storage, credit, trans-
portation access, and public distribution be credible, 
transparent, and predictable. The private sectors will thrive 
if policies are clear and consistent, if red-tape does not 
hinder their day-to-day operations, and if public policies do 
not prevent them from adopting new risk-mitigating institu-
tions, such as futures markets.
Arguably, the public sector has a role to play in price 
support and stabilization. Compared to the world market, 
all reviewed countries successfully stabilized the prices of 
foodgrains. However, the levels around which stability was 
achieved, the approaches used, and the distribution of benefits 
(or costs) varied widely among the countries.
The lesson that emerges is that prices should be stabi-
lized around a band that leaves enough room for private  
traders to cover all marketing costs, including the opportu-
nity costs of human and physical capital. The potential ben-
efits of stabilization around a band are high. It provides much 
more flexibility than stabilizing around a point, can reduce the 
costs, encourage private-sector investments, and potentially 
defuse powerful opponents. Higher arbitrage opportunities 
from wider bands (and withdrawal of other restrictions) 
should attract more private traders and increase competi-
tion, which in turn can drive prices down. The criteria for 
devising such a band depends on several factors, but the rule 
of thumb is to use free-on-board (f.o.b.) costs as the lower 
bound and cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f). costs (including 
trade margins) as the upper bound.
Very little policy emphasis has been given to developing 
institutions such as agricultural commodity exchanges, which, 
in combination with warehouse receipts and futures markets, 
have historically been shown to improve market efficiency and 
alleviate credit and insurance constraints. As the private sec-
tor grows and the role of parastatals diminishes, there will be a 
need to promote these mechanisms, which have proven track 
records to mitigate price risks, reduce public expenditure on 
price stabilization, and minimize the size of buffer stocks.
Even if the private sector can be relied on to ensure 
efficient allocation of resources, the need for social safety 
nets (SSNs) remains. A review of various SSN programs  
in India concludes that self-targeted programs are more 
cost effective than universal food-subsidy programs.  
Therefore, from the efficiency point of view, it is best to 
move away from universal food subsidies to more focused 
distributions in combination with employment programs 
that target disadvantaged areas and commodities that  
the poor consume. 
The Challenges  of Making the 
Changes Work
The economic arguments for making policy changes are 
very clear. But in the end, political decisions prevail. Politi-
cians want to be re-elected, and political survival depends 
upon ensuring that the public has adequate and accessible 
food because urban unrest can bring down governments. 
But farmers often have strong lobbies, as do embedded 
public institutions, particularly those with rents to distrib-
ute. Thus, politicians tend to play it safe in cases where 
many people would gain only a little from a particular 
reform, but a few powerful people would lose a lot.
Success will depend on understanding and responding 
to the concerns of various stakeholders and adjusting the 
government’s role as the policies change. The good news is 
that the level of information technology (a key factor in the 
implementation of desirable price bands, targeted SSNs, 
and stockholding in strategic locations) has grown dramati-
cally in Asia, as has the human capital needed to imple-
ment and promote the changes. Thus, it is high time for the 
food-policy managers to put this technological know-how 
to work and develop the strategic information systems nec-
essary to implement successful reforms.
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